Your country does not decide how much privacy you deserve.

1. Scope and equal protection

This declaration covers demands from law-enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, military, and other government authorities to identify a user; disclose or preserve data; intercept or monitor communications; restrict an account; or provide technical assistance. It applies to the ICQ2 network, ICQ2.net, and every official ICQ2 client for Windows, Linux desktop, Linux terminal, macOS, iOS, iPadOS, Android, or another platform, including future official clients. It applies regardless of the user's nationality, residence, language, political views, religion, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or other status.

For this policy, “ICQ2” includes the service currently offered under that name and any successor service name adopted by I Seek You Too LLC. A rename, rebrand, new official client, or replacement product name does not reset, narrow, or end these protections.

A government does not receive greater access merely because it calls a request lawful, confidential, urgent, or related to national security. Every demand must be independently authenticated and reviewed under applicable United States law. We examine the original requesting authority and the ultimate government beneficiary; using an international organization, contractor, private party, another country, infrastructure provider, or other intermediary does not bypass this policy.

2. Our starting position

I Seek You Too LLC does not voluntarily provide nonpublic ICQ2 user information to foreign governments or their agents for an ordinary investigation. The only proposed voluntary exception is a narrowly reviewed, genuine emergency involving imminent danger of death or serious physical injury when disclosure is authorized by United States law. An informal request, police letter, diplomatic request, local subpoena, or local court order does not by itself require a United States company to disclose ICQ2 data.

Foreign authorities ordinarily must use applicable international legal-assistance channels that result in valid United States process. A United States order originating from a foreign request still receives the same scope, constitutional, human-rights, sanctions, and user-notice review; the foreign origin is not erased by the domestic process. An order submitted under a qualifying CLOUD Act agreement receives a separate review of the agreement, issuing authority, target, offense, legal validity, necessity, proportionality, and human-rights safeguards. A CLOUD Act label is not automatic approval.

A government-supplied consent form or purported user authorization is not a shortcut. We do not treat it as voluntary consent without lawful and safe independent verification with the user and review for custody, threats, pressure, deception, or other coercion.

We will not voluntarily trade nonpublic user data, secret access, bulk access, or weakened security for permission to operate, an app distribution channel, restoration of connectivity, a license, or avoidance of blocking in a country. A compulsory demand is reviewed under this policy; market pressure does not turn it into consent.

We comply with final compulsory process that is valid and enforceable against the company after available objections are considered. We do not promise to violate United States law or a final United States court order. When there is a reasonable lawful basis, we will seek to reject, narrow, stay, or challenge a demand that is invalid, overbroad, disproportionate, or dangerous to human rights.

3. Human-rights review

We use the safeguards Congress placed in 18 U.S.C. § 2523 as a minimum review framework for foreign-government demands, even when a demand does not formally arise under that section. We consider rule of law, nondiscrimination, privacy, fair-trial rights, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, protection against arbitrary detention and torture, independent review, specificity, seriousness of the alleged offense, necessity, proportionality, and minimization.

Heightened review is required when a demand may identify or expose a journalist or source, human-rights defender, political opponent, whistleblower, religious or ethnic minority, LGBTQ+ person, labor organizer, peaceful protester, or another person at heightened risk of retaliation. We will not voluntarily disclose information for the purpose of suppressing peaceful speech, journalism, political or religious belief, lawful association, or peaceful assembly.

If disclosure may foreseeably contribute to arbitrary detention, disappearance, torture, cruel treatment, unlawful discrimination, or another serious abuse, the request is escalated to qualified United States counsel. We will use available lawful objections and will not provide discretionary assistance.

Labels such as terrorism, extremism, national security, misinformation, or foreign agent are not proof of violent conduct and do not end this review. We require the underlying facts, the specific offense, the connection between the requested data and that offense, and the United States legal standard applicable to the data sought.

United States constitutional baseline

The First Amendment protects freedom of religion, speech, press, peaceful assembly, and petition, and United States constitutional doctrine recognizes that compelled disclosure of associations can chill protected activity. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires probable cause and particularity for warrants. For process governed by United States law, we review burdens on protected expression, press, religion, assembly, and association, and we require the probable cause, particularity, and judicial authorization applicable to the records sought.

These constitutional protections constrain government conduct; they are not an absolute shield for every record held by a service provider. The company may not have standing to assert every right on behalf of every user, and this policy does not promise to disregard a final enforceable United States order. It does require us to identify and use available objections, narrowing, notice, and review before production.

4. Sanctions and government designations

We do not maintain a frozen list of disfavored countries. Lists and legal restrictions change, and country-only screening can miss sanctioned agencies, organizations, officials, intermediaries, and ownership relationships.

At the time of a request, we will check relevant current United States government sources, including the Department of State's terrorism designations and country human-rights reporting, the Treasury Department's OFAC sanctions lists, sanctions programs and country information, and applicable ownership rules. A potential sanctions match stops substantive cooperation until qualified sanctions counsel determines what United States law permits or requires and whether an OFAC authorization is necessary.

A sanctions or terrorism designation is an escalation signal, not a substitute for legal analysis and not a judgment about an individual user. The absence of a designation never eliminates human-rights review.

5. Legal process and data categories

A demand must identify a specific account or other precise selector, the records requested, the relevant period, the issuing authority, the ultimate government beneficiary, the underlying conduct and facts, and the legal basis. We reject fishing expeditions and do not provide direct, persistent, or unrestricted access to our systems.

• Public profile information may already be visible according to the user's selected profile settings at the relevant time. Public visibility does not convert unpublished profile fields, contact relationships, or private communications into public data.
• Basic subscriber information requires valid compulsory process sufficient for that information.
• Connection records, relationship data, and other sensitive metadata receive heightened review and the strongest process required by applicable law for the requested category.
• Private message content is not disclosed on an informal request or ordinary subpoena. We require a valid search warrant or a legally equivalent content order recognized under applicable United States law.

Data stored only on a user's device is not company-held data merely because an official ICQ2 client created it. Unless the user sends that data to us, synchronizes it through a future service feature, or the company otherwise possesses or controls it, I Seek You Too LLC cannot retrieve or produce it. A demand for data held by a device vendor, cloud-backup provider, mobile carrier, Internet provider, or app store must be directed to that separate entity under its own legal process and policies. We do not ask an intermediary to collect more data or use an intermediary to avoid our own review. Where practicable, we seek provider terms that require notice to us before disclosure when law permits and limit provider access to what the service requires.

We disclose only responsive records that we possess or control. We do not create new surveillance records, begin prospective collection, or retain additional data merely because an authority asks informally. We do not create or provide passwords, functioning session credentials, signing keys, a back door, or a way to bypass ordinary account security as a substitute for targeted lawful production. A demand for real-time interception, prospective monitoring, decryption assistance, account action, or other technical assistance requires its own specific legal authority and review; a demand for stored records does not authorize those different actions.

6. Notice to the user

Before disclosure, we will provide the affected user with reasonable notice and a copy or meaningful description of the legal process so the user can seek legal advice and challenge it. We may delay notice only when a valid law or court order prohibits notice, or when immediate notice would create a documented danger of death or serious physical injury.

We will review nondisclosure demands for legal sufficiency, duration, and scope; seek modification or judicial review when there is a reasonable legal basis; calendar expiration dates; and provide delayed notice promptly when the prohibition ends and the law permits it. Boilerplate confidentiality language or an authority's preference is not by itself a valid prohibition on notice.

7. Emergency requests

An emergency request does not bypass review. Voluntary emergency disclosure is considered only when specific facts support a good-faith belief that disclosure is necessary without delay to address an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury. Property loss, reputational harm, political offenses, general unrest, and an authority's use of the word “emergency” are not enough.

We independently verify the requesting authority, require a written explanation of the threat and how each requested item could address it, disclose no more than strictly necessary, record the decision, and request follow-up legal process where appropriate. Foreign emergency demands receive mandatory human-rights and sanctions screening and, whenever feasible, are routed through an appropriate United States authority or qualifying CLOUD Act designated authority. Direct disclosure to a foreign authority requires qualified counsel to confirm that United States law permits it and that the minimum disclosure is strictly necessary to address the immediate danger.

8. Preservation is not disclosure

A valid preservation request may require us to preserve specified records already in our possession while an authority seeks proper legal process. Preservation does not authorize disclosure and does not permit an authority to use the account. We limit preservation to identified accounts, data categories, and the period required by law. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), the ordinary period is 90 days, with one additional 90-day period upon a renewed request. We do not treat serial, overlapping, or nominally new requests as an automatic indefinite hold; any further retention requires a fresh, independently valid legal basis and new counsel review.

9. Transparency and accountability

Once this policy becomes operational, we will publish a periodic aggregate report covering government demands received, accounts specified, requests rejected or narrowed, disclosures made, preservation requests, emergency disclosures, foreign requests, and user notices. National-security reporting will use only the delayed ranges and categories permitted by United States law.

Every response must be approved by authorized company leadership and qualified counsel. Ordinary support personnel may route a request but may not search for, preserve, or disclose user data in response to it.

10. Important limits of the current alpha

A policy cannot make accessible data technically inaccessible. The current ICQ2 service requires encrypted network transport for released official clients, but the system does not provide end-to-end encryption. The service can process message content, and the current server does not yet implement a fixed automatic deletion schedule for delivered messages. Server records and backups may therefore contain message content and associated metadata, regardless of which official client sent or received the message.

Device-local protection differs by operating system and client version. This policy does not claim that every client has identical local storage, backup, recovery, notification, or device-compromise protections. Those facts must be disclosed accurately for each released client in the Privacy Policy and platform documentation.

Users whose safety depends on preventing a service operator from accessing message content should not rely on the current alpha for those communications. This policy does not prevent a valid United States order, compromise of the service, compromise of a user's device, or coercion outside the service. End-to-end encryption, verified deletion and recovery controls require separate technical work and must not be implied by legal wording.

11. Status and contact

This public declaration describes the protections we propose to make operational. Before this declaration becomes an effective policy, I Seek You Too LLC must establish a dedicated legal-process channel, secure case handling, qualified outside counsel, a sanctions-review procedure, and a tested production workflow. Ordinary customer support is not authorized to accept service of legal process or disclose user information.

Draft review date: August 25, 2026